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ABSTRACT
Detection and Analysis of Malware Evolution
by Sunhera Barunkumar Paul
Malware is a malicious software that causes disruption, allows access to unapproved
resources, or performs other unauthorized activity. Developing effective malware
detection techniques is a critical aspect of information security. One difficulty that
arises is that malware often evolves over time, due to changing goals of malware
developers, or to counter advances in detection. This evolution can occur through
various modifications in malware code. To maintain effective malware detection, it is
necessary to detect and analyze malware evolution so that appropriate countermeasures
can be taken. We perform a variety of experiments to detect points in time where a
malware family has likely evolved. We then conduct further experiments to confirm
that such evolution has actually occurred. We validate our approach by considering a
number of malware families, each of which includes a significant number of samples
collected over an extended period of time. All of our experiments are based on machine
learning models, and hence our techniques require minimal human intervention and
can easily be automated.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malware is malicious software that causes disruption in normal activity, allows
access to unapproved resources, gathers private data of users, and similar improper
behavior. Developing measures to detect malware is a critical aspect of information
security.
Malware often evolves due to changing goals of malware developers, advances in
detection, and so on [1]. This evolution can occur through various modifications in
the code. It is useful to detect and analyze malware evolution so that appropriate
measures can be taken to improve the effectiveness of detection techniques [2].
In most previous works on malware evolution, reverse engineering methods have
been employed, since a large number of malware samples need to be analyzed, this is
a highly labor-intensive process. Whereas other researches have analyzed properties
of malware evolution through a graph pruning technique [3]. Recent work has been
conducted on malware evolution, which is primarily based on PE file features, support
vector machines (SVM), and 𝜒2 similarity [4]. This latter research was successful and
has the advantage of being easily automated, with no reverse engineering required.
Our proposed research can be viewed as an extension of and improvement on the
groundbreaking work in [4].
We have performed several experiments in this research to detect points in time
where a malware family has likely evolved, and further experiments to confirm that
such evolution has actually occurred have also been performed. These experiments
have been conducted using a significant number of malware families, each of which
including a large number of samples over an extended period of time. And, all these
experiments are based on machine learning models.
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For a particular given malware family, we have first separated all the samples
based on windows of time and the opcode sequence from every sample has been
extracted. We have then used these opcodes as the input features to detect malware
evolution. We have implemented different ways in which we can modify the feature
vectors on which a linear SVM is trained and then using the average feature weights
obtained from the linear SVM model, we plot a 𝜒2 similarity graph and obtain our
observations about whether a family has evolved or not from it. To confirm malware
evolution, we have also trained Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) on either side of the
most significant spikes in the 𝜒2 similarity graph, and then have used both of these
models to score samples on either side of the spike. If a clear distinction between
scores across such a spike is observed, it shows that the samples differ substantially
on either side.
Conclusively, the main objective of this project is to implement different machine
learning models and use them to detect malware evolution in a malware family. 15
different malware families have been experimented with, in this project utilizing
the above mentioned techniques, and interested results for the same have also been
obtained. Furthermore, Chapter 2 involves a discussion about the previous work that
has been done in this area. Chapter 3 provides an overview about the dataset that is
used and the different machine learning models and techniques that have been used in
the implementation of this project. Chapter 4 discusses the results that have been
obtained by implementing the various mentioned techniques. The conclusion of the




Comparing with the work done in the fields of malware classification and detection
using various machine learning techniques, it can be evidently seen that very little
work has been done in the field of malware evolution. A vast amount of phenomenal
research has been seen in the field of malware classification and its detection. Although
the research is vast and extremely informative, it is equally important that malware
evolution is also studied and researched, with respect to its detection techniques using
machine learning. It might be very easily possible that the intent of the malware family
might change, and with its continuous evolution, it is also possible that the technique
required for detection will require evolving as well. Hence to protect and prevent
unnecessary malware attacks, focus should be equally given to malware evolution.
A robust research work on malware is observable in [3]. This research is built on
extensive and diverse malware data-set spanning from nearly two decades, demon-
strating that inheritance properties of malware also form to be a major factor in the
consideration. A graph pruning techinque has been practiced to deduce this data-set.
This research likewise also has claimed and revealed that many specific traits of
families have been “inherited” ,from other families of the data-set. However, it is also
not notably attested that all of the mentioned “inherited” traits are indeed inherited,
as opposed to the matter that these traits may have risen from alternative sources
or independently developed. Furthermore, the graph-based analysis in [3] requires
“extensive manual investigation” ,in contrast to the technique which is considered in
this paper.
As opposed to considering changes in Android non-malware, or goodware, the
authors in [5] have extracted a range of features, determining the trends based on
standard metrics of software quality by considering changes in the quality of Android
3
malware. This work fairly surprisingly also shows that the trends in malware and
good-ware are noticeably similar, implying that malware writers have been striving
to improve their software necessarily to the same level of efficiency as the good-ware
writers on the other hand.
The paper [6] displays the plausibility to detect new variants, which is also an
essential evolution detection problem. The authors have rather considered the problem
of detecting malware variants, which might otherwise defeat the machine learning
based detectors. This approach mainly relies on an extensive and vast feature set,
employing semi-supervised learning, while the approach in this paper has a greater
advantage of being an unsupervised technique along with general code modifications
being easily detectable.
The work in [7] nominally focuses on malware taxonomy, however, displaying a
great deal of detail in their analysis. This analysis provides significant insight into
malware evolution, including “genealogical trajectories”, with this work being outlined
on features that have been extracted from malware encyclopedia entries (developed by
antivirus software vendors, such as Trend Micro). Based on support vector machines
(SVM), using language processing concepts, a sophisticated machine learning approach
has been applied to these features that have been extracted from the malware entries.
Machine learning models are mainly trained on features. Thus, extracting ap-
propriate features from the dataset to obtain the results is very important. Malware
researchers have broadly classified the features as static and dynamic. The ones that
can be obtained without executing the code are known as static features and the ones
collected by executing the code are known as dynamic features. Thus, static features
are more efficient and easy to collect whereas dynamic features are more robust with
techniques [8].
4
The work in [4] is focused on using static features of the malware samples namely,
the PE file features. The research uses the PE file features of the malware samples in
a family and uses them as feature vectors to train a linear SVM. The SVM models are
trained over various different windows of time periods to analyze in which time period
a change has occurred. Then a 𝜒2 distribution graph is plotted using the average
feature weights obtained from the models. This graph shows a significant change over
the different time windows which can be termed as a change in the malware family,
that is, an evolution. This approach was successful and was easily automated with no
reverse engineering required.
The research in this project is related to the work seen in [4]. The experiments in
this project can be viewed as the extension of the groundbreaking work done. Using
the above mentioned research, we want to experiment using opcodes as the input
features to train the linear SVM model. We also use different machine learning models
on the opcodes to help obtain feature vectors and then train SVM models on it. Since,
there was no technique used to confirm the evolutionary changes in a malware family





In this chapter, we give a broad summary of the malware families and the dataset
used in the research. We will also be discussing the different features and machine
learning models that were used to conduct our experiments. All these taken together
forms the basis of our evolutionary analysis.
3.1 Dataset
Not explicitly defined, although, a malware family normally represents a collection
of malware samples that have major traits in common. Certainly, over time, every
family will have a code base that would definitely have many shared similarities in
their characteristics. This research makes use of a malware dataset consisting of 26,245
Windows portable executable (PE) files, belonging to 15 distinct malware families.
Table 1 exhibits the distinct malware families and the number of samples per family
that have been used in the research.


















Of the data-set used in this research, two malware families (Winwebsec and Zbot)
are acquired from the Malicia dataset [9], while the remaining thirteen families are
extracted from a larger data-set collected using VirusShare [10]. The latter data is
greater than half a terabyte in size and contains about 500,000 malware executables.
Upon request, these data-sets are made available, by the above mentioned authors.
The prime motivation for choosing the mentioned specific malware families for
this research, is that these families have sufficient amount of samples required for
training, also satisfactory to the time window that is in consideration. We need
sufficient number of malware samples in each family to perform our experiments.
To enhance the efficiency of experimentation in this work, we have organized
all the malware samples in each family, as per its creation date. During this initial
wrangling process, samples having altered creation date or those that have undergone
altered compilation, have been discarded [4].
Further on, we briefly discuss each of the malware families in our dataset. Note
that these families represent a wide variety of types of malware, including Trojan,
worm, adware, backdoor, and so on.
Bifrose is another backdoor trojan that allows an attacker to connect to a remote IP
using a random port number. Some variants of Bifrose have the capability to
hide files and processes from the user. An attacker can view system information,
retrieve passwords, or execute files by gaining remote control of the system [11].
CeeInject aims to conceal itself from detection, and malware families use it as a
shield to prevent detection. For example, CeeInject can obfuscate a bitcoin
mining client, which might be installed on a system to mine bitcoins without
the user’s knowledge [12].
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DelfInject is a worm that enters a system from a file passed by other malware, or as
a file downloaded accidentally by clients when visiting malignant sites. DelfInject
drops itself onto the system using an arbitrary document name (e.g., xpdsae.exe)
and alters the relevant registry entry so that it runs at each system start. The
malware then injects code into svchost.exe so that it can create a connection
with specific servers and download files [13].
Dorkbot is a worm that steals user names and passwords by tracking a user’s
online activities. It blocks security update websites and can launch DoS attack.
Dorkbot is spread via instant messaging applications, social networks, and flash
drives [14].
Hotbar is an adware program that installs itself on a user’s computer, or it may be
downloaded by a user from a malicious website. Hotbar displays advertisements
as the user browses the web [15].
Hupigon is a family of backdoor trojans. This malware opens a backdoor server
enabling other remote computers to control a compromised system [16].
Obfuscator hides its purpose through obfuscation. The underlying malware can
have virtually any payload [17].
Rbot is a backdoor trojan that enables an attacker to control an infected computer
using an IRC channel. It then spreads to other computers by scanning for
network shares and exploiting vulnerabilities in the system. Rbot includes many
advanced features, and it has been used by attackers to launch denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks [18].
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VBinject primarily serves to disguise other malware s that can be hidden inside of
it. VBinject is a packaged malware, i.e. a malware that utilizes techniques of
encryption and compression to obscure its contents. Thus making it difficult
to recognize any other malware that it is concealing. VBinject was first seen in
2009 and appeared again in 2010 [19].
Vobfus is a malware family that downloads other malware onto a user’s computer. It
uses the Windows autorun feature to spread to other devices such as flash drives.
Vobfus makes long lasting changes to the device configuration that cannot be
restored simply by removing the malware from the system [20].
Winwebsec is a trojan that presents itself as an antivirus software. It shows mislead-
ing messages to the users stating that the device has been infected and attempts
to persuade the user to pay to remove non-existent malware [21].
Zbot is a Trojan horse that attempts at stealing confidential information from a
compromised computer. It explicitly targets system data, online sensitive data,
and banking information. It can also be easily modified to accumulate other
kinds of data. The Trojan itself is generally disseminated through drive-by
downloads and spam campaigns. Zbot was originally discovered in January
2010 [22].
Zegost is a backdoor trojan as well, that injects itself into svchost.exe, thus allowing
an attacker to execute files on the compromised system [23].
3.2 Feature Extraction
Opcodes are known to be machine level language instructions which specify a
particular operation that has to be performed [24]. For this project, we have malware
portable executable files as the dataset, so we extract opcodes from these executable
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files to use as input features to the machine learning models. We have also segregated
the malware samples in each family according to its creation year. Thus, as features
we are using the opcodes from the malware samples in each family grouped according
to its timestamp.
3.3 Background of Classification Techniques
In this section we will be discussing the techniques that we have used in this
project.
3.3.1 Support Vector Machines (SVM)
Support Vector Machines (SVM) is amongst the popular class of supervised
machine learning algorithms, attempting to finding a separating hyper-plane, between
two labeled classes of data [25]. By utilizing the so-called “kernel trick”, an SVM
easily maps input data to a higher dimensional space, where the additional space has
the ability to afford a greater opportunity, to find a separating hyperplane. For every
individual feature used in training, a linear SVM has assigned a well-defined weight to
it improving the efficiency of ranking of the features as these weights primarily define
the relative importance that SVM has placed on each feature.
The aforementioned feature ranking process, is based on the weights obtained
from linear SVMs, which makes it a very crucial aspect of the SVMs resulting in
maming them very useful and as the main machine learning technique to tackle the
malware evolution problem that we are considering in this project.
The described feature rankings, that are based on the weights of a linear SVM,
can be utilized in eliminating features that contribute very little to the model but
are beneficial in obtaining an insight into the training data. The ranking is produced
by directly sorting the features according to the absolute values of the corresponding
weights in a linear SVM model.
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The following steps are followed to train a linear SVM:
1. Given training data (𝑋𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) for 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛 where each 𝑋𝑖 is a real-valued
feature vector of length 𝑚, and each 𝑧𝑖 ∈ {−1, +1} is the corresponding class
label.
2. Train a linear SVM on the given training set to obtain the set of model weights
𝑤𝑗 , for 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑚.
3. Rank the features in decreasing order of significance, based on the absolute
value of the corresponding weights. That is, determine a permutation 𝜋 =
(𝜋1, 𝜋2, . . . , 𝜋𝑚) for which the weights of the linear SVM satisfy |𝑤𝜋(𝑗)| ≤ |𝑤𝜋(𝑗+1)|,
for 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑚 − 1.
4. Return the 𝑚 ranked feature weights, 𝑤𝜋(1), 𝑤𝜋(2), . . . , 𝑤𝜋(𝑚).
Here, the value of |𝑤𝑗| is directly proportional to the significance of 𝑗th feature in
the trained linear SVM. Since the use of a nonlinear kernel function does not enable
us to directly determine the relative importance of individual features, it is important
to note that this feature ranking technique is restricted to a linear SVM.
The two classes in the SVM are defined as follows: All the samples within the
most recent one-year time window comprise class are classified as class “+1”, while all
samples from the current month are defined as class “−1” [4]. For example, in Table 2
we give three consecutive time windows, along with the time frames corresponding to
the two classes in each case.
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Table 2: Sliding time window example
Time Window Class +1 Class −1
Jan. 2011–Jan. 2012 Jan. 2011–Dec. 2011 Jan. 2012
Feb. 2011–Feb. 2012 Feb. 2011–Jan. 2012 Feb. 2012
Mar. 2011–Mar. 2012 Mar. 2011–Feb. 2012 Mar. 2012
3.3.2 𝜒2 Statistic
Defining in mathematical terms, the 𝜒2 statistic is a normalized sum of square







where 𝑛 denotes the number of features or observations, 𝜒2 is the cumulative statistic,
𝑂𝑖 is the observed value of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ instance, and 𝐸𝑖 is expected value of 𝑖𝑡ℎ instance.
For experimentation purposes in this project, this statistic is considered over a
specific time window and is used in quantifying the differences obtained from SVM
feature weights, as compared to using the average feature weights over extended
periods of time. In this context, the extended periods of time is termed as a year
and the specific time window as a month. Thus, to explain in simplified terms, we
consider computing the difference in the 𝜒2 statistic between models for a month
and then use the average model over the most recent year. This 𝜒2 statistic is the
plot through overlapping time windows, and any points in the graph where there
is a substantial change (i.e., a “spike”), the graph indicates a point where the code
base changes significantly from the baseline. These are points of interest, since they
indicate the times at which the code has been significantly modified [4].
3.3.3 Word2Vec
This section in the paper discusses about the Word2Vec language model technique.
This technique here has been used to obtain word embedding for the extracted sequence
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of opcodes from the malware sample files. The word embeddings are essentially the
vector representations of a word and the Word2Vec model technique makes the use of
these word embeddings to find the similarity between words, as the main objective of
using this technique is to find words with similar context, i.e close spatial positions [26].
Word2Vec is a shallow, two-layer neural networks as in Figure 1 which is trained
to recreate the linguistic contexts of words. It creates a vector space, ranging to a
dimension that is as large as several hundred dimensions, by taking in a large corpus
of words [27]. Every word from this corpus is assigned to a corresponding vector in the
space, with words sharing common contexts in the corpus placed in close proximity
of others vectors in the space and are accordingly positioned in the vector space.
Word2Vec is a particularly computationally-efficient predictive model for learning
word embeddings from raw text [27].
Figure 1: Word2Vec model architecture
Besides having a single hidden layer, like all neural networks, it has weights, and
during training, its goal is to adjust those weights to reduce a loss function. However,
here we are not using Word2Vec for the task it was trained on previously, instead,
we are just taking its hidden weights, and using them as our word embeddings as
depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Hidden layer of Word2Vec model
In neural networks, a word cannot be fed as a string. Thus, here we feed the
words as one-hot vectors, which essentially means that the vector is of the same length
as the vocabulary, filled with zeros, except at the index that represents the word we
want to represent, which is assigned “1”.
The hidden layer of Word2Vec is a standard, fully-connected (Dense) layer, with
its weights being the word embeddings [27]. The output layer of the Word2Vec
produces the probabilities for the target words from the vocabulary, and the rows
of the hidden layer weight matrix, are the word vectors (word embeddings) we need.
This results in the hidden layer operating as a lookup table and the output of the
hidden layer is just the “word vector” for the input word (Figure 2). This Word2Vec
model can be implemented using two distinct approaches, the continuous bag-of-words
model and the skip-gram model as in Figure 3. Algorithmically, these models are
similar.
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Figure 3: Types of Word2Vec models
A continuous bag-of-words (CBOW) model predicts target words (e.g. ‘mat’)
from the surrounding context words (‘the cat sits on the’). Statistically, it has the
effect that CBOW smooths over a lot of the distributional information (by treating
an entire context as one observation). This turns out to be a useful thing for smaller
data-sets, for most parts in consideration [27].
In contrast to CBOW, a skip-gram model predicts surrounding context words
from the target words (practically the inverse of CBOW). Looking at the statistics,
skip-gram treats each context-target pair as a new observation, and this tends to
perform better when we are dealing with larger data-sets.
A Word2vec model can also be trained with hierarchical softmax and/or negative
sampling, but usually, only the negative sampling is used. A hierarchical softmax
method uses a Huffman tree to reduce calculation, to approximate the conditional
log-likelihood a model seeks to maximize. Hierarchical softmax works better for
infrequent words [27]. Naturally, as training epochs increase, hierarchical softmax
stops being useful.
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Figure 4: Using softmax classifier in Word2Vec
Alternative to sampling the whole vocabulary, negative sampling reduces compu-
tation by sampling just 𝑛 negative instances along with the target word. Technically,
negative sampling ignores most of the ‘0’s in the one-hot label word vector [27]. More
concretely, the negative sampling samples the negative instances(words), along with
the target word and minimizes the log-likelihood of the sampled negative instances,
while also maximizing the log-likelihood of the target word. These negative samples
are chosen using a unigram distribution. Normally, the probability of selecting a word
as a negative sample is related to its frequency, with more frequent words being more
likely to be selected as negative samples.
In our experiments, we are using this technique by considering the malware sample
as the document and the extracted opcodes from it as the words. Thus we obtain the
word embeddings for the 20 most frequent opcodes in the sample and then use the
vectors of each of these opcodes to train the linear SVM model. We also experiment
with different number of vector sizes for the embeddings to observe if a particular
vector size gives us better results.
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Figure 5: Using negative sampling in Word2Vec
3.3.4 Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
This section discusses the Hidden Markov Model (HMM). We have used an HMM
model to obtain feature vectors for the extracted opcode sequence from the malware
samples. These are then used to train a linear SVM to obtain average feature weights.
Before we use the HMM model for our implementation let us discuss about what the
technique is.
The Markov Model is a statistical model comprising of states and known proba-
bilities of the state transitions [28]. The hidden Markov model (HMM) has states that
are not directly observable in contradiction to the states of the Markov Model that
are directly visible to the observer. HMM in Figure 6 is a machine learning technique
and it acts as a state machine.
For examining a set of observation symbols, every state is associated with a
probability distribution with the probabilities for this transition between the states
being fixed. To represent a data, it is easy to train an HMM using the observation
sequences [29]. This observation sequence can be matched against a trained HMM
to determine the probability of seeing such a sequence. The observation sequence is
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similar to a training sequence if the probability sequence is high. As mentioned in [30],
the following table shows the notations used in the hidden Markov models:
Table 3: HMM notation
Notation Explanation
𝑇 Length of the observation sequence
𝑁 Number of states in the model
𝑀 Number of observation symbols
𝑄 Distinct states of the Markov process, 𝑞0, 𝑞1, . . . , 𝑞𝑁−1
𝑉 Possible observations, assumed to be 0, 1, . . . , 𝑀 − 1
𝐴 State transition probabilities
𝐵 Observation probability matrix
𝜋 Initial state distribution
𝒪 Observation sequence, 𝒪0, 𝒪1, . . . , 𝒪𝑇 −1
The observations are always denoted by {0, 1, . . . , 𝑀 −1}, since this simplifies the
notation with no loss of generality. That is, 𝒪𝑖 for 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑇 −1. A generic hidden
Markov model is illustrated in Figure 6, where the 𝑋𝑖 represent the hidden state
sequence and all other notations are as defined above. The Markov process—which is
hidden behind the dashed line—is determined by the current state and the 𝐴 matrix.
We are only able to observe the 𝒪𝑖, which is related to the (hidden) states of the
Markov process by the matrix 𝐵. A hidden Markov model is defined by the matrices
𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋. An HMM is denoted as 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋).
Figure 6: Hidden Markov Model
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The following three problems can be solved efficiently using the HMM algorithms:
Problem 1 : Given a model 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) and an observation sequence 𝒪, we need
to find 𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆). That is, an observation sequence that can be scored to see how
well it fits a given model.
Problem 2 : Given a model 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) and an observation sequence 𝒪, we can
determine an optimal state sequence for the Markov model. That is, the most
likely hidden state sequence can be uncovered.
Problem 3 : Given 𝒪, 𝑁, 𝑀, we can find a model 𝜆 that maximizes probability of
𝒪. This is the training of a model in order to best fit an observation sequence.
In this project, we have utilized the algorithms for Problems 1 and 3 above. An
HMM is trained to represent a set of data, that is in the form of observation sequences.
We trained this model using variety of compilers and malware generators. This is
equivalent to using the algorithm for Problem 3. The resulting HMM is then used to
score the malware samples against the model.
In this project, we are training HMM models on the top 20 most frequent opcodes
and an ‘other’ category [28].These opcode sequences are extracted from the malware
samples. For every malware sample we obtain an HMM model from which we use
the 𝐵 matrix as the input features to train linear SVM models. The 𝐵 matrix
gives us information about the observation transition probabilities and we use the 𝐵
matrix vector as input to the SVM model which generates feature weights for all the
observations that is the opcodes. This approach might further give us better results
and prove an evolutionary change in the malware family.
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3.3.5 Experimental Approach
This section outlines the approach we follow to automatically determine points
in time where significant evolutionary changes occur in malware families. First, we
select a malware family from our dataset and tag each sample in the family according
to the date on which it was compiled. Once this is done, we then extract the opcode
sequences from each of the malware samples. Then we train a linear SVM based
on the opcodes discussed above. We also use word embeddings (vectors) of varying
vector sizes obtained from Word2Vec model and also the 𝐵 matrix from HMM as
input feature vectors to the linear SVM model.
As discussed above, when training, one class consists of all samples belonging to
the specific family within a one-year time window, while the other class consists of the
samples from the subsequent one-month time window. Such a model contrasts the
family characteristics over a one month period to the characteristics of the previous
one-year time interval. From each such model, we rank all features based on the linear
SVM weights. Then we shift our time window one month ahead, and again train an
SVM and rank the features as just described [4].
In this way, we obtain a series of snapshots of ranked features based on overlapping
sliding windows, each based on a one year duration and each offset by one month.
We use this as a basis for tracking changes in the significance of various features and
we q„uantify those changes using the 𝜒2 statistics, as discussed above. To confirm
the changes observed in the statistics obtained from the above approach, we also
train HMMs on either side of the significant spike in the distribution. If the samples
score very differently on each of the models, this confirms our analysis of evolutionary
changes in the family.
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In the next chapter, we first verify if the different approaches discussed in this
chapter enable us to detect changes within a given timeline. We then compute and





In this chapter, we discuss the results and analysis of the experiments performed
by training various pipelines of machine learning techniques on the Malware data-set.
This chapter has four sections, each discussing the results of experiments that have
been conducted using different techniques.
4.1 Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
We have already seen that by using PE file features of the malware samples we
can detect evolutionary changes in a malware family. These features are used to train
linear SVM models over sliding window periods of time and a 𝜒2 distribution graph is
then plotted using the feature weights obtained from them. The graph tells us about
the changes in the malware family according to the feature weights obtained. The
changes or spikes as observed in the graph were considered as the points of evolution
in the malware family. But the research didn’t mention about using any other types
of methods to confirm the evolutionary points in the family. The confirmation of the
evolution taking place in a particular malware family is done using Hidden Markov
Models in this section.
This section particularly deals with training HMM models using the top 20
opcodes and an ‘other’ category extracted from the malware samples. We will be
discussing the use of HMM model in confirming the evolutionary changes and also use
this method in asserting the results obtained in the experiments performed later in
this project.
Once distinct spikes have been obtained from the 𝜒2 similarity graph from the
linear SVM models over different time periods, we train an HMM model on both sides
of the most significant spikes using the extracted opcode sequences from the malware
samples. Both the models are then used for scoring malware samples of the same
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family. We then use these scores to plot a line graph denoting the two different scores
of the same sample on the two models. This distinction in the scores is due to the
change in the models. If the two models obtained had been the same, the samples
would have given same scores but the difference in the scores of the same samples
on both the models conclusively tells us, that the models are different. Hence, the
malware samples should also be termed as different that is evolved. In this way, we
can verify the evolutionary changes obtained in a family using various methods.
(a) Malware samples before spike (b) Malware samples after spike
Figure 7: Hidden Markov model trained before and after the spike
The Figure 7 depicts two line graphs of the scores obtained from scoring the
malware samples before and after the spike on the 𝜒2 distribution graph on two HMM
models. First, we train an HMM model using samples from before the spike and then
train another one using the samples from after the spike. These models are then used
for scoring samples before and after the spike.
Figure 7 (a) shows the graph for the malware samples before the spike. The blue
line indicates the scores of the HMM model trained before the spike and the green line
indicates the scores of the model trained after the spike. All the scores are obtained
on scoring both the models using samples from before the spike. In the similar way,
Figure 7 (b) shows the scores of the samples from after the spike. The violet line
shows the scores of the model which is trained on samples before the spike and the
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orange line shows the scores of the model trained with samples after the spike. In all
cases, the scores are log likelihood per opcode (LLPO) that is, the scores have been
normalized using the length of the opcode sequence.
It can be observed from both the graphs that for every sample that has been
scored, the scores are distinct from each other. This clearly implies that the two
models are fairly different from each other because if the models had been the same,
the scores would have been the same or with very less difference. This distiction in
the scores leads us to believe that the malware family has evolved because without an
evolution the models should be similar. Thus, it can be concluded that this technique
give us an insight in confirming the evolutionary points obtained from the other
machine learning techniques. This approach is also used for the further experiments.
Whenever any experiment is said to find an evolutionary point in the family, the claim
has been confirmed using this approach.
4.2 Opcodes — SVM
In this section, we discuss the experiments on the 15 malware families. Each
family has numerous samples which are segregated according to their timestamp.
From each of these malware samples, we then extract opcodes for our experiments.
These opcodes are then used as inputs to the linear SVM model. The SVM model
is trained for sliding windows of time periods and then, a 𝜒2 distribution graph is
plotted using the feature weights obtained from each of the models trained.
In the Figure 8, we discuss experiments on the Zegost family for 506 malware
samples. We perform our SVM feature analysis on the Zegost family based on the most
frequent 20 opcodes and the ‘other’ category. We have also experimented with higher
number of opcodes, but it showed same results and thus we choose to use 21 opcodes.
Specifically, these experiments utilize Zegost samples from 2008 through 2011. As
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above, we determine linear SVM weights for multiple overlapping time windows.
Figure 8 gives the 𝜒2 statistic timeline for the Zegost family for our SVM feature
weight experiments. It can observed from the graph that the weights of the opcodes
keep fluctuating and as a result we can see that there are multiple spikes in the graph.
On analyzing these spikes, that is training HMM models on either side of them to
check evolution, we couldn’t find any convincing evidence which could determine
that these points were the points of evolution. Thus, we can say that the changes
observed in the graph by using opcodes to train the linear SVM models does not give
us valuable information to detect evolutionary changes in the Zegost family.
Figure 8: 𝜒2 similarity graph for Zegost family using opcodes
We also obtained the resultant 𝜒2 distribution graphs for the remaining 14 malware
families as well. For Adload and Bho family in Figure 9, from the graph we can
observe that the graph does not show any significant spikes except the one at the
extreme end which is in the last time period. Thus, from the graph it should mean
that there has been no evolution in the family except in the last time period. But on
confirming this observation using the HMM models, we could find that there have
been evolutions in the family but the graph obtained by the current approach that is,
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by using opcodes to train the linear SVM models does not show it and thus give us
false results. Thus we can say that this method is not beneficial to detect evolutionary
points.
Using this experiment for Bifrose, Ceeinject, Hupigon and Rbot from Figure 9, we
can clearly observe that there a lot of fluctuations in the graph, but these fluctuations
do not impart any meaning in detecting evolutionary points in the families. They
imply that there are a lot of changes in the opcode sequences of the family.
(a) Adload (b) Bho (c) Bifrose
(d) Ceeinject (e) Delfinject (f) Dorkbot
(g) Hupigon (h) Zbot
Figure 9: 𝜒2 statistics on using opcodes as input
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There can be a lot of variations in the opcode sequences extracted from the
malware samples which depend either on which developer has written a particular
malware sample or maybe on the purpose of the sequence written. Thus, opcodes
sequences even though for a particular malware family but might contain a lot of
variations in the sequences in which they are used and thats why, when we use the
raw opcode sequences in training linear SVM models, over different time periods, we
obtain variations in the feature weights as the opcode sequences keep changing from
sample to sample in the same family. Thus, we should be refining the input features
that we are training the SVM model on. Training the SVM model on stabilized input
features giving information about the opcodes from the entire sample might be more
beneficial in obtaining results.
Thus, we tried using the byte 𝑛-gram approach with the opcodes and use the
𝑛-grams as an input to train the SVM model. A 𝑛-gram language model is a contiguous
sequence of 𝑛 items from a given sample. Here our given sample is the malware sample
so we will be considering 𝑛-gram of opcodes, that is the sequences of opcodes in which
they are occurring in the malware sample in a particular family. We experimented
over different values of 𝑛 for the 𝑛-gram approach where 𝑛 = 2, 3, 5, 10.
(a) Zegost 2-gram (b) Zegost 5-gram
Figure 10: 𝜒2 statistics of Zegost family on using 𝑛-gram
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Figure 10 shows the 𝜒2 similarity graph for the various 𝑛-gram approaches on the
Zegost family. From the results, there is not significant change in the average weights
when we try different 𝑛-grams of opcodes. It does not give us any understanding of
any evolutionary changes in the malware family. There are a lot of fluctuations in the
graph but they do not impart any meaningful information regarding the evolution in
the family. Thus, using 𝑛-grams of opcodes with SVM does not give us any distinct
results about the evolution of a malware family, as we are dealing with the opcode
sequences and not an input feature which tells us about the whole malware sample.
(a) Adload 2-gram (b) Ceeinject 2-gram (c) Bho 2-gram
(d) Delfinject 2-gram (e) Bifrose 2-gram
Figure 11: 𝜒2 statistics of different families on using 𝑛-gram
In Figure 11 we implemented the 𝑛-gram approach with the other families too,
to check if this approach provides same observations for all the families. From the
results obtained, we can say that this technique does not give us any insight about
the evolution in a malware family. We need to use the opcode sequences obtained
from the malware samples and obtain input features from it which would contain
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information about the whole malware sample. In the next sections, we use Word2Vec
model embedding vectors and the 𝐵 matrix of an HMM as the input feature vectors
to train the linear SVM models. These input features would contain the information
regarding the whole sample rather than a single instruction sequence.
4.3 Word2Vec — SVM
In this section we discuss the experiments on 15 malware families by using
Word2Vec models. In this approach, we train Word2Vec models on the extracted
opcodes for each malware sample in the family and then use the Word2Vec embeddings
of each of the 20 most frequent opcodes and the ‘other’ category as feature vectors
to train a linear SVM model over each time window. We then compute the 𝜒2
similarity with the feature weights of all the models, and we plot these values on a 𝜒2
similarity graph. Spikes in this graph indicate points in time where the weights of the
corresponding SVM’s differ significantly, which are points where it is likely that the
malware has evolved to a significant degree.
(a) Zegost Vector Size 2 (b) Zegost Vector Size 3
Figure 12: 𝜒2 statistics of Zegost family on using Word2Vec-SVM
Figure 12 gives the 𝜒2 statistic timeline for the Zegost family based on our
Word2Vec-SVM feature weight experiments. From Figure 12, it can be observed that
feature weights in certain time windows diverge significantly from their average values.
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Specifically, these time periods are November 2010 and May 2011, as can be seen from
the graph.
We also use different vector sizes of the Word2Vec embeddings. But as we see in
Figure 12 (a) and 12 (b), both the vector sizes show us that the significant spike in
the distribution graph is in the same time period. Thus we can say that a change has
taken place in that particular time period, in this case, November 2010 - May 2011,
as compared to the other time periods that we are experimenting with.
On analyzing these results using the HMM verification technique, we can confirm
that the time period obtained from the graph is the time where the malware family
has evolved. The different vector sizes are not of much importance here, as we are
obtaining similar results for both. Thus, we can say that the Word2Vec approach
gives us the time periods in which malware evolution has taken place. In both the
figures 12 (a) and 12 (b), we do observe some other small spikes in the graph but that
is mainly due to noise in the feature vectors on which the linear SVM model is trained.
These spikes do not impart any meaningful information to our observations. But this
is in the case of the Zegost family. We should consider the same approach on other
families as well.
Figure 13 shows the 𝜒2 statistics of the Word2Vec feature vectors and the linear
SVM approach in the other malware families. Four families out of these results namely,
Bho, Bifrose, Adload and Vobfus perform very well with this approach and give us
significant spikes in the 𝜒2 distribution graph.
In Figure 13 (a) it can be observed that a significant spike is obtained from the 𝜒2
distribution graph. On applying the HMM verification approach, we can positively
say that this spike is a point of evolution in the malware family. We train Word2Vec
models on the extracted opcode sequences from the samples and then use the opcode
embedding vectors to train the linear SVM model. In training the Word2Vec model,
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(a) Bho vector size 2 (b) Bifrose vector size 2 (c) Adload vector size 2
(d) Ceeinject vector size 2 (e) Rbot vector size 2 (f) Hupigon vector size 2
(g) Vobfus vector size 3
Figure 13: 𝜒2 statistics of other families on using Word2Vec-SVM
we go through the most frequent 20 opcodes and an ‘other’ category in every malware
sample. Thus, the embedded vectors obtained from the Word2Vec model to use as
the input features are dependent on the entire malware sample and considers the
complete malware sample. This is the reason why we obtain convincing results of
malware evolution from this approach as compared to the earlier approach.
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The other malware families Bho, Bifrose and Vobfus also show significant spikes in
the 𝜒2 distribution graph. These results have been confirmed by the HMM verification
method too. Thus, we can positively say that the Word2Vec method is useful in
detecting evolution. But for some of the other families, the Word2Vec approach does
not seem to be performing well. In Figure 13, we can see that for Ceeinject, Dorkbot,
Hupigon and Rbot this technique seems to not give any conclusive results. The graph
shows a lot of fluctuations in it and a result cannot be obtained from them.This might
be because of the changes in opcode sequences in each family.
Every malware sample might have a variety of different opcode sequences and
thus, on calculating the average feature weights from the linear SVM models on these
samples, they show a lot of fluctuations in the graph because the sequences of opcodes
in the sample keep changing as well. Every family has its own unique opcode sequence
and thus, some approaches might work well with some families but not all of them.
4.4 HMM — SVM
In this section we discuss the experiments on 15 malware families by using HMM
models. In this approach, after extracting the opcode sequences from each malware
sample, we train an HMM model on them using 20 most frequent opcodes and the
’other’ category that occurs in the sample. We then use the B matrix obtained from
HMM, that is, the resulting observation probability matrix as a feature vector to
train linear SVM models over each time window. We then compute the 𝜒2 similarity
of the SVM weights of nearby (in time) models, and we plot these values on a 𝜒2
similarity graph. Spikes in this graph indicate points in time where the weights of the
corresponding SVM’s differ significantly, which are points where it is likely that the
malware has evolved to a significant degree.
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(a) Zegost without restarts (b) Zegost with 10 restarts
Figure 14: 𝜒2 statistics of Zegost family on using HMM-SVM
Figure 14 gives us the 𝜒2 statistic timeline for the Zegost family (506 samples)
for our HMM-SVM feature weight experiments. From this figure, we do nor observe
a significant change in the average weights which would indicate that evolutionary
change has taken place. There are fluctuations in the graph telling us that there are
changes in the instructions of the malware samples and thus a feature vector from an
HMM model cannot be used to display evolutionary changes in Zegost family.
But we need to make sure if the HMM model is being converged in order to get
the most accurate vectors from the model and thus, we have also implemented random
restarts in obtaining a converged HMM model. But the results obtained from the
various number of random restarts were the same as that of the results obtained from
the model with no random restarts implying that the HMM model is getting converged
in this case. We also experimented using two different values of the number of states
for the HMM model, 𝑁 = 2, 3. But the results obtained from these experiments were
also not helpful in observing a distinct spike in the 𝜒2 distribution graph for Zegost
family. But the results on just one family might not be enough to conclude upon an
approach. Thus we implement this approach on the other families as well.
Figure 15 shows the 𝜒2 statistics of the HMM 𝐵 matrix as feature vectors and the
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(a) Adload (b) Zbot (c) Bho
(d) Bifrose (e) Ceeinject (f) Delfinject
(g) Dorkbot (h) Hupigon
Figure 15: 𝜒2 statistics of other families on using HMM-SVM
linear SVM approach in the other families as well. Overall, the HMM-SVM approach
seems to be working better than the Word2Vec approach as we could detect malware
evolution in more families through this approach. From Figure 15 we can make the
following observations about each figure:
Adload — An evolutionary event takes place in the time window Sep 2010–May
2011.
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Zbot — No significant spike is observed in the graph.
Bho — A malware evolution takes place in the time window Nov 2008–May 2011
Bifrose — A malware evolution takes place in the time window March 2010–June
2011. The other spike in the period June 2009–Jan 2011 is a part of noise in the
data. This was confirmed by training HMMs on both sides.
Ceeinject — A malware evolution takes place in the time window June 2009–April
2011.
Delfinject — No significant spike is observed in the graph.
Dorkbot — No significant spike is observed in the graph.
Hupigon — A significant spike in the time period June 2010–Jan2011 is observed in
the graph.
From Figure 15 we can conclude that we can observe significant spikes in almost
all the families using the HMM-SVM approach. For the families Adload, Bho, Bifrose,
Ceeinject and Hupigon we can observe significant spikes in the 𝜒2 distribution graph.
When confirmed using the HMM verification technique, these spikes are detected to
be the points of evolution in the malware families. Other than the significant spikes
there are also a few number of smaller spikes in the graph, they are mainly due to
noise that is there due to the variations in the 𝐵 matrix obtained from the trained
HMM models on the opcode sequences. Thus, we can assert that the HMM-SVM
approach is useful in observing evolutionary changes in a malware family.
While comparing the families in which we could detect evolutionary changes
using Word2Vec approach and the HMM approach, we can clearly observe that the
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evolutionary points obtained by both the approaches are the same and they also match
with the evolutionary points obtained in the research earlier.
While some families did not perform well with the HMM approach as well, but
we can conclusively say that it is because of the variations in the 𝐵 matrix obtained
from the HMM models trained on every malware sample. But overall, this technique




Conclusion And Future Work
In the previous research, a significant spike in the chi square similarity graph
obtained by using PE file features with a linear SVM model proved that there was a
change in the malware family which was termed as malware evolution. In this project,
we have confirmed the change in the malware family as an evolution by training HMM
on either side of the significant spike in the graph and then scored samples on both
the models. The scores obtained from these models were quite distant from each other,
hence, proving the point that the two models are different, and a malware evolution
has taken place.
Since PE file features of the malware samples were used to determine malware
evolution in the earlier work, we used opcodes as the input feature in all our experiments.
We extracted the opcode sequences from each of the malware samples from each of
the families and used them as our input feature. All through our experiments we have
used the top 20 most frequent opcodes and an ‘other’ category for our analysis.
In the first set of experiments, we used the opcodes and trained a linear SVM model
over different windows of time periods in a single malware family. The resultant average
feature weights obtained from the model were then used to plot a 𝜒2 distribution
graph. We observed the graphs of 15 different malware families but couldn’t find any
significant change in the graph which could imply an evolution in the family. The
graphs had a lot of fluctuations in them which meant that the weights associated with
the opcodes were changing a lot and thus, a proper result cannot not be obtained
from them.
In the next set of experiments, we used a byte 𝑛-gram approach with the opcodes
as the input to the linear SVM model. The 𝜒2 distribution graph for this too had a
lot of fluctuations in them and thus, no observation about an evolution could be made
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from them other than the fact that this approach cannot be used to detect malware
evolution in a family and also that using the raw opcode sequences with the linear
SVM model does not give us any meaningful explanation about the malware family
used.
We then trained a Word2Vec model using the extracted opcodes from the malware
files. The word embeddings of the opcodes were then used to train a linear SVM
model. We used different number of vector sizes of the word embeddings to feed to
the SVM model to see which vector size worked better but there wasn’t a particular
number that worked for all so it meant that it was a little random. The same type of
experimentation was done by training an HMM using the opcode sequences and then
using the B matrix obtained from the HMM as the input feature to the linear SVM
model. For training the HMM and also to ensure the convergence of the model, we
tried different number of random restarts.
On plotting the 𝜒2 distribution graphs using both the approaches mentioned
above, for some of the families we observed significant spikes in the distribution graph
for both the methods. Although some noise could be seen in these graphs along with
the distinct spike in it, but overall, we could see a change in the malware family. On
training an HMM on either side of the spikes and scoring some samples on it, we could
successfully state that a malware evolution has taken place in the families. Thus,
using the Word2Vec model and the HMM model on the opcodes before feeding it
into the linear SVM model proved to be a successful approach in detecting evolution.
While this was true for some families, there were also some families which didn’t
show any significant spikes in their graphs and were filled with a lot of fluctuations.
These graphs implied that these families had a lot of changes in their code and these
approaches cannot detect the evolution in them if present.
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5.1 Future Work
Our research mainly focused on using opcodes extracted from the malware
samples. Various other features can also be used to detect changes in the malware
family. Combinations of features can also be explored as input features. They might
yield additional observations about malware evolution over different windows of time
periods.
Malware obfuscation techniques like dead code insertion affect the static features
of a malware file but it would not have much effect on evolution tracking that is based
on dynamic features. Thus, using dynamic features might help in gathering more
insights about malware evolution in a family.
Another area to consider would be using deep learning techniques to analyze
malware samples in a family to detect changes in them. Even though such techniques
are difficult to implement and are complex, but it would be very interesting to observe
the results obtained from using deep learning methods.
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(a) Before spike (b) After spike
Figure A.16: HMM verification technique on Figure 12 showing evolution on Zegost
using Opcode-Word2Vec-SVM
(a) Before spike (b) After spike
Figure A.17: HMM verification technique on Figure 13(a) showing evolution on Bho
using Opcode-Word2Vec-SVM
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(a) Before spike (b) After spike
Figure A.18: HMM verification technique on Figure 13(h) showing evolution on Vobfus
using Opcode-Word2Vec-SVM
(a) Before spike (b) After spike
Figure A.19: HMM verification technique on Figure 13(d) showing that the family
has no evolution on Ceeinject using Opcode-Word2Vec-SVM
(a) Before spike (b) After spike
Figure A.20: HMM verification technique on Figure 15(c) showing evolution on Bho
using Opcode-HMM2Vec-SVM
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(a) Before spike (b) After spike
Figure A.21: HMM verification technique on Figure 15(d) showing evolution on Bifrose
using Opcode-HMM2Vec-SVM
(a) Before spike (b) After spike
Figure A.22: HMM verification technique on Figure 15(e) showing evolution on
Ceeinject using Opcode-HMM2Vec-SVM
(a) Before spike (b) After spike
Figure A.23: HMM verification technique on Figure 15(h) showing evolution on
Hupigon using Opcode-HMM2Vec-SVM
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(a) Before 2010 (b) After 2010
Figure A.24: HMM verification technique on Figure 15(f) showing that the family has
no evolution on DelfInject using Opcode-HMM2Vec-SVM
(a) Before spike (b) After spike
Figure A.25: HMM verification technique for second spike on Figure 15(g) showing
that the family has no evolution on Dorkbot using Opcode-HMM2Vec-SVM
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